Bluetooth Project Experience X

Abstract :

Objectification of the existence of detectable MAC addresses over the Bluetooth frequency range following inoculation of COVID antigen therapy and COVID detection PCR test.

Team :

Germán Sarlangue
Julien devilleger
Philippe trillaud
Steve Fouchet
Lidwine Taillasson
Gregory Catteau

Source link:

https://ln5.sync.com/dl/195df4a10/5ab9apq6-q5vqawam-vgr3ktt9-7zr985rh

1 / Foreword

Since April 2021 rumors have spread on social networks concerning the appearance of bluetooth-type signals following one or more anti-covid injections offered by pharmaceutical companies:

- Astra Zeneca
- Pfizer
- Johnson and Johnson
- Moderna

Many videos have circulated which seem to highlight the appearance of disturbing phenomena, namely:

- Unexplained magnetization phenomena on different sites of the body of injected people (which gave rise to an explosion of publications on TikTok grouped around a community movement, The Magnet Challenge).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYi3sjRZviA

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- The appearance of Bluetooth MAC addresses in the presence of injected people and in the absence of any technological device likely to explain these appearances.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1VCRZNaHLE

- The appearance of signals during a scan carried out on the body of a person injected by means of animal microchip detection equipment commonly used by veterinarians.

https://www.tiktok.com/@jasmine_0708/video/6974140084870237445

All these rumors were denied by the mainstream media and traditional news agencies even though in the alternative networks many empirical experiments carried out by ordinary citizens seemed to prove the contrary.

https://www.reuters.com/article/factcheck-astrazeneca-bluetooth-idUSL2N2NC2G9

https://www.20minutes.fr/sante/3067959-20210623-coronavirus-non-vaccins-permettre-etredetecte-bluetooth-gare-videos-trompeuses

However, empirical citizen experiences are multiplying:

https://henrymakow.wordpress.com/2021/09/17/le-vaccin-contient-votre-code-barres/

https://echelledejacob.blogspot.com/2021/11/vaccines-et-puce-bluetooth-mise-jour.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1VCRZNaHLE

https://odysee.com/@Hemeroteca:f/DrDeBenito-mac-address--:7

https://odysee.com/@Pigeon_Pige-TouT_Traduction:6/bluetooth-2:e

In France, the first documented experiment on the subject was the subject of an article published in Agoravox

(https://www.agoravox.fr/tribune-libre/article/operation-dent-bleue-235064)

However, as Jérôme R. responsible for the publication of the article underlines, even if the results obtained are questionable (many unidentified MAC addresses appear), it could not be a question of drawing a hasty conclusion.

Indeed, the experimental ground was a public garden from which could originate many legitimate signals emanating from devices not taken into account and its detection equipment (An Archos mobile phone running Android) could also be the object of potential flaws in the detection

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Obviously, these experiments, which only show a final result, were not part of any assumed protocol, did not in any way allow the reliability of the results to be demonstrated.

At the same time, numerous studies have been carried out to objectify the presence of graphene oxide or one of its derivatives in the composition of the vaccine.

It is important to understand that graphene oxide has been the subject of a plethora of studies around its unique physicochemical and electromagnetic properties.

Commercial applications are already available:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMB2I_bq0zc&feature=youtu.be

At the same time, there are official patent filings aimed at developing nanotechnologies implanted in the human body, such as nanosensors, or various devices using electromagnetic radiation allowing all kinds of potential applications.

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US4717343?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US3951134?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US5159703?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US5507291?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US6017302?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US6052336?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US6506148B2/en?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US10300240B2/en?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

https://patents-googlecom.translate.goog/patent/US5629678A/en?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

Finally, faced with the secret nature of the composition of the injections as well as the negotiated impunity of pharmaceutical companies with regard to the possible undesirable effects linked to the injections, certain studies have emerged highlighting disturbing elements:

https://corona2inspect.blogspot.com/2021/11/identificacion-patrones-vacunas-coronavirusnanorouters.html

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356507702_MICROSTRUCTURES_IN_COVID_VACCINES_inorganic_crystals_or_Wireless_Nanosensors_Network

https://corona2inspect.blogspot.com/2021/09/redes-nanocomunicacion-inalambricananotecnologia-cuerpo-humano.html

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M5T_pa4d87vznN0r0IUpjrSb07sqO9vh/view?usp=drivesdk

2 / Hardware environment and technical configuration.

For this experiment, it was chosen to work with an Ubertooth one antenna from Great Scott Gadgets, the technical specifications of which are below:

- RP-SMA connector (intended to connect the Bluetooth antenna)
- CC2400 Full duplex 2.4 GHz wireless transmission module
- CC 2591 front end RF module
- LPC175x ARM Cortex-M3 microcontroller
- Full-speed USB 2.0 connection
- Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy support
- Approximate amperage of 220mA

It can send and receive packets at 2.4 GHz, which is the frequency of Bluetooth, but also see Bluetooth traffic in real time in monitor mode. The device is comparable to a Class 1 Bluetooth module, i.e. it has a maximum power of 100 mW (20 dBm) and a range of 100 meters without obstacles.

Regarding the laptop, our choice fell on a machine:

- Intel Core I7-6600U processor (2.6 Ghz)
- RAM memory: 16 GB DDR3
- Intel HD Graphics 520 graphics card
- 240 GB SSD hard drive.



The Bare metal installer 2021-3 version of Kali linux has been downloaded from:https://kali.download/base-images/kali-2021.3/kali-linux-2021.3-installer-amd64.iso.torrent

In ISO file.

It was mounted on a classic 32 GB USB key as a bootable disk image via the Rufus application (https://rufus.ie/en/)

Once the Kali linux OS installed on the machine, an upgrade of the latter was carried out (

```
sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get upgrade.
```

As no conflict was detected, the machine was restarted.

The Ubertooth project is an Open Source project.

The full code is available on Git.

So we started by installing the various necessary packages:

```
sudo apt-get install cmake libusb-1.0-0-dev make gcc g ++ libbluetooth-dev \

pkg-config libpcap-dev python-numpy python-pyside python-qt4
```

Followed by a classic update:

```
sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get upgrade
```


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We then proceeded to install the latest version of libbtbb.

```
sudo ldconfig

wget https://github.com/greatscottgadgets/libbtbb/archive/2020-12-R1.tar.gz -O libbtbb-2020-12-R1.tar.gz

tar xf libbtbb-2020-12-R1.tar.gz

cd libbtbb-2020-12-R1

mkdir build

cd build

cmake ..

make

sudo make install

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get upgrade
```

Then we installed the Ubertooth tools:

```
wget https://github.com/greatscottgadgets/ubertooth/releases/download/2020-12-R1/ubertooth-2020-12-R1.tar.xz -O ubertooth-2020-12-R1.tar.xz

tar xf ubertooth-2020-12-R1.tar.xz

cd ubertooth-2020-12-R1 / host

mkdir build

cd build

cmake ..

make

sudo make install

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get upgrade
```

We then proceeded to the Ubertooth One firmware update:

```
cd ubertooth-2020-12-R1 / ubertooth-one-firmware-bin

sudo ubertooth-dfu -d bluetooth_rxtx.dfu -r

cd ../ ..

sudo apt-get update
```


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```
sudo apt-get upgrade
```

We carried out the control thanks to the command:

```
ubertooth-util -v
```

Who referred us:

```
Firmware version: 2020-12-R1 (API: 1.07)
```

We therefore connected the Bluetooth antenna to the motherboard of the Ubertooth one and plugged the latter into a USB port of the machine and launched the command:

```
ubertooth-specan-ui
```

Who opened a window for us:



Once the device was configured and functional, we closed the window and proceeded to install the plugins.

We started by installing the wireshark plugins:

```
sudo apt-get install wireshark wireshark-dev libwireshark-dev cmake

cd libbtbb-2020-12-R1 / wireshark / plugins / btbb

mkdir build

cd build

cmake -DCMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR = / usr / lib / x86_64-linux-gnu / wireshark / libwireshark3 / plugins ..
```

make

```
sudo make install

cd libbtbb-2020-12-R1 / wireshark / plugins / btbredr

mkdir build

cd build
```


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```
cmake -DCMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR = / usr / lib / x86_64-linux-gnu / wireshark / libwireshark3 / plugins ..

make

sudo make install

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get upgrade
```

Then we proceeded to configure Kismet.

To do this we started by removing all the pre-existing configurations:

```
sudo rm -rfv / usr / local / bin / kismet * / usr / local / share / kismet * / usr / local / etc / kismet *
```

We then proceeded to install and update the necessary packages:

```
python -m pip install --upgrade pip

pip install libpcap

sudo apt-get install libcap-dev pkg-config \

build-essential libnl-dev libncurses-dev libpcre3-dev \

libpcap-dev libcap-dev
```

In order to install the latest version of kismet.

```
wget -O - https://www.kismetwireless.net/repos/kismet-release.gpg.key | sudo apt-key add -

$ echo 'deb https://www.kismetwireless.net/repos/apt/release/kali kali main' | sudo tee /etc/
apt/sources.list.d/kismet.list

wget http://www.kismetwireless.net/code/kismet-2021-08-R1.tar.gz

tar xf kismet-2021-08-R1.tar.gz

sudo mv kismet-2021-08-R1 / usr / src / kismet

ln -s ../ubertooth-2021-08-R1/host/kismet/plugin-ubertooth / usr / src / kismet

cd / usr / src / kismet

sudo ./configure

sudo make && sudo make plugins

sudo make suidinstall

sudo make plugins-install

cd ~


sudo apt-get update
```


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```
sudo apt-get upgrade

sudo apt install kismet-core kismet-capture-linux-bluetooth kismet-capture-linux-wifi
kismetcapture-nrf-mousejack python-kismetcapturertl433 python-kismetcapturertladsb
pythonkismetcapturertlamr python-kismetcapture freaktabs-logtabs -zigteaktabs ~

sudo apt-get update

sudo apt-get upgrade

sudo apt install kismet-capture-linux-bluetooth
```

We switched the machine off and on again, then carried out the usual checks.

When launching kismet via the command

```
sudo kismet
```

A window opens asking us to define a login and a password.



What we have done.

Then we selected ubertooth one in the Data Sources list:

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

We tested the application: It is perfectly functional.

We then configured Wireshark to allow Bluetooth packet capture.

To do this we have configured a pipe:

```
mkfifo / tmp / pipe
```

Then we opened wireshark from the command:

```
sudo wireshark
```

In the window that opened we clicked on capture -> Options-> Manage interfaces -> Pipe -> New where we entered in the “pipe” field:

```
/ tmp / pipe
```



Finally on the terminal we entered the command:

```
ubertooth-btle -f -c / tmp / pipe
```


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In the sources we have chosen bluetooth and launched the capture: perfectly functional.

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3 / Preliminary tests

On 10/16/2021 around 9:30 a.m. we carried out preliminary tests in an open-air field near the town of Chabournay.

The exact GPS coordinates of the site are as follows: 46 ° 44'49.6''N 0 ° 13'32.0''E.

The red dot marks the place where the detection station has been installed.

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The area is located on cartoradio:



The location of the experiment is indicated by a red dot in a red square.

The various highlighted sites correspond to relay antennas whose characteristics are accessible here .

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3/1 The pre-tests

The antenna is connected, the servers activated.

The protocol starts.

The candidates start from the blue point and follow the path (small green dots) towards the detection station (red dot).

In a number of cases, Bluetooth signals are activated spontaneously about 30 meters from the station (purple dot)

The pre-test is conclusive and functional, making it possible to validate the test protocol planned for the next day.

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3/2 Course of the experience

The experiment takes place on 10/17/2021 in the town of Cognac La forêt.

A Cartoradio location gives the following topography:



The various highlighted sites correspond to relay antennas whose characteristics are accessible **here**.

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A reconnaissance of the places leads us to install the detection equipment at the location indicated on the map.

3/2/1 technical preparation

The cameras are carefully configured and the personnel likely to intervene in the detection zone are tested one after the other.

The following instructions were given to them:

- No cell phone
- No connected watch
- No connected equipment (headset, headset, etc.)

Once these prerequisites have been met, they take the test several times in a row:

- Alone and without material
- Alone with equipment switched off
- Only with shooting equipment switched on.

Cameras and sound recording equipment are wired and transmission systems are all disabled.

As a result of these adjustments, two additional passages are made to objectify the total absence of detected signal.

3/2/2 Progress of the experiment

At the same time, applicants are grouped together at the reception area (near the parking area) and a questionnaire is given to them to complete.

They all receive the same instructions and a person physically checks the execution of the instructions.

One by one, they follow the route identified in purple as “volunteer route”.

The purple dots mark the places where the different signals appeared.

3/2/3 Results obtained

The table below gives the order in which the signals appear.

Hourly	Pass number	Signal detection	Code found	Code found	YES	Parasite?	Identification
10:16							
10:21	1	No	None			nothing	
10:26	2	Yes	53: cd: 58: dd: 53: d2		Unknow not	nothing	
10:31	3	Yes	50: 76: 35: 50: 8f: 36	73: dd: d1: 6d58: f9	Unknow not	nothing	
10:36	4	No	None			nothing	
10:41	5	No	None			nothing	
10:46	6	No	None			nothing	
10:51	7	No	None			nothing	
10:56	8	No	None			nothing	
11:01	9	No	None			nothing	
11:06	10	No	None			nothing	
11:11	11	No	None			nothing	
11:16	12	No	None			nothing	
11:21	13	No	None			nothing	
11:26	14	No	None			nothing	
11:31	15	Yes	6f: 12: bd: 31: 60: f9		Unknow not	nothing	
11:36	16	Yes	67: 87: 07: 71: fb: ff		Unknow not	nothing	
11:41	17	No	None			nothing	

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11:46	18	Yes	f1: 5th: 84: 4c55: 30	67: 87: 07: 71: fb: ff	Unknow not	nothing	
11:51	19	No	None			nothing	
11:56	20	No	None			nothing	
12:01	21	Yes	57: 58: 87: 13: a3: 98			69: f4: 76: 99: 6d: de	Android
12:06	22	No	None			nothing	
12:11	23	No	None			nothing	
12:16	24	No	None			nothing	
12:21	25	No	None			nothing	
12:26	26	No	None			nothing	
12:31	27	No	None			nothing	
12:36	28	No	None			nothing	
12:41	29	No	None			nothing	
12:46	30	No	None			nothing	
12:51	31	No	None			nothing	
12:56	32	No	None			nothing	
13:01	33	No	None			nothing	
13:06	34	No	None			nothing	
13:11	35	No	None			nothing	
13:16	36	Yes	55: la: e4: bc: ae: d9		Unknow not	69: f4: 76: 99: 6d: de	Android
13:21	37	No	None			69: f4: 76: 99: 6d: de	Android

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3/3 Raw analysis of the results

The first conclusions of the experiment are reported in the following summary tables:

Raw data		Issue	no emission	Doubt
Number of persons	37	7	30	2
Injected	15	6	9	2
Not injected, tested	2	1	1	0
Not injected, not tested	20	0	20	0

Either in percentage:

Percentages		Issue	no emission	Doubt
Number of persons	37	19%	81%	5%
Injected	15	40%	60%	13%
Not injected, tested	2	50%	50%	0%
Not injected, not tested	20	0%	100%	0%

This experiment therefore indisputably highlights the following elements:

- No uninjected, untested person emits a signal
- A few injected people emit signals in about 40% of cases
- Some people not injected and tested emit signals in 50% of cases.

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3/4 Further exploration

In view of these experiences, several uncertainties remain full and complete:

- The measurement time
- Potential interactions with the electromagnetic environment
- Social interactions
- The detectability of signals emanating from people not injected and tested.

A new experiment was therefore undertaken on 07/11/2021 at a different location.

This new place has the advantage of having troglodyte caves sufficiently airtight to be able to act as a Faraday cage.

3/4/1: Course of the experiment

On the first day, the postulants were grouped together in a reception tent located on the upper part of the land more than 50 meters from the opposite of the main entrance to the caves.

The same instructions were given to them and the same strict vigilance was observed with regard to the observance of the instructions.

The distribution of applicants is as follows:

- 2 people not injected not tested
- 7 people not injected and tested
- 8 people injected

A scan was carried out upstream inside the cave which highlights the total absence of Bluetooth traffic.

The experiment takes place over two days:

Day 1

There were 16 candidates present, distributed as follows:

- 2 people not injected not tested
- 6 people not injected and tested
- 8 people injected

Day 2

Was present a candidate not injected and tested

During these two days, the protocol applied is as follows:

Each candidate identifies himself upstream, under the tent.

It is assigned a passage number.

Every 20 minutes, a new candidate presents himself in the troglodyte cave where the scanning equipment has been installed and spends 20 minutes in the latter with a view to the possible detection of a Bluetooth signal.

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3/4/2: Results of the experiment

Day 1 :

The candidates follow one another one by one.

Only one MAC address is recorded:

c4: df: 27: f9: 45: b5

This is a doubly injected person

Day 2 :

Only one candidate is present.

This is a person not injected but muti tested by PCR tests (about 70 tests)

Two Mac addresses appear simultaneously with almost identical references:

4c: 64: fd: da: fc: 5f

4c: 64: fd: da: fc: 9f

In view of these results, we chose to continue the experiment.

We have turned the kismet server off and on again.

The signals received no longer appear.

We then went up to the stage, under the tent to test a possible reactivation of the signal in the presence of a less protected environment.

After 20 minutes of scanning no new signal appears.

We then asked the candidate to undergo some physical exercises in order to verify a potential relationship between the body energy released by the candidate and a signal activation.

After 20 minutes of scanning no new signal appears.

We then asked someone from the team to gradually bring the candidate's cell phone (Samsung) closer in order to start checking for possible man-portable interactions.

No particular activity is detected with the notebook in off mode.

We renewed the experience with the laptop in airplane mode.

No particular activity is detected with the notebook in off mode.

We repeated the experiment with the cell phone in normal mode, bluetooth off.

No particular activity is detected with the laptop in this configuration.

We then activated the bluetooth of the candidate's device.

Bluetooth is detected, strictly normal traffic takes place, no suspicious MAC address appears.

We then brought a second cell phone (Also a Samsung) in normal mode, bluetooth enabled.

The devices communicate coherently with each other and no additional MAC address appears.

Finally, in order to retrieve additional data, we continued to scan the traffic in the ambient environment, the candidate returning to the interior of the house in which 6 mobile phones were present in various conditions, an internet box with 2 wifi relays.

We gradually turned off all the devices and then turned them back on one by one.

It should be noted that out of all the people present, only the candidate was tested by PCR.

Strictly normal traffic is noted, which corresponds to the exchange of data between the different devices.

There is also a significant number of invalid frames and unknown or uninterpretable packets with the Wire Shark software.

We can therefore reasonably conclude that both injected and tested people emit signals outside of any activation induced by an environmental electromagnetic field.

However, these signals do not seem constant over time and their activation seems to depend on conditions that remain to be defined.

(See conclusions and perspectives below.)

4 / Use of raw data

4/1 Reminder of the context

During these experiments, we were able to observe and capture the exchanges (frames) emitted by unknown devices in places devoid of any signals.

During these experiments which did not have the necessary material for a complete analysis, we performed a scan employing a scanning mode using Ubertooth equipment.

This card allowed us to scan all the frequencies used by the Bluetooth protocol.

BTLE in its version 5 has 40 channels which have been scanned in turn and at regular intervals.

The Bluetooth BTLE protocol is commonly used for many applications and so we started with the exploration of classic construction methods relying on this technology.

Many resources exist.

For exemple :

https://www.bluetooth.com/bluetooth-resources/intro-to-bluetooth-low-energy-coded-phy/

4/2 Volume of information retrieved

During the first experiment, 37 participants followed one another which allowed the capture of a total of 43,043 frames.

During the complementary experiment, 17 participants followed one another, which enabled the capture of a total of 30,120 frames.

This gives us a total of 73,163 frames recovered over 6 hours and a half of scanning from 34 people. (People not injected and not tested excluded).





Study made possible thanks to the financial support of the LNPLV (infovaccin.fr), EFVV (efvv.eu) and many anonymous donors. 11/30/2021

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4/3: First protocol analyzes:

Among these frames, for the most part malformed according to the frame formats recognized by the Wire Shark software, which indicates at least a customization of the protocol stack, we find packets consistent with the Bluetooth protocol for messages of the type:

- BT MeSH
- BTLE AUX_SCAN
- AUX_CONNECT
- Unknown messages (or not recognized and interpreted by Wire Shark)

4/3/1: Packets corresponding to BT MeSH messages

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
7161	2960.543347	58:0a:c3:d2:48:97	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
7862	2994.097600	58:0a:d3:96:40:a7	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
7998	2999.604954	7d:b1:b8:db:56:e6	Broadcast	BT Mesh	50	
13087	3277.684980	58:0a:c3:96:c0:07	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
13563	3297.790018	78:1a:c7:96:c0:57	Broadcast	BT Mesh	38	
14530	3337.208369	78:8a:c3:96:c0:07	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
15508	3398.354239	58:0a:c3:96:c0:06	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
15912	3414.543270	4f:00:2e:b4:d6:b3	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
22146	4154.972222	71:38:40:70:59:96	Broadcast	BT Mesh	57	
22251	4164.171849	71:38:40:10:19:d6	Broadcast	BT Mesh	57	
22356	4173.301911	70:38:40:10:1a:d6	Broadcast	BT Mesh	54	
22994	4280.266887	7b:19:7f:bd:5a:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
24197	4499.638238	5b:69:30:24:20:b4	Broadcast	BT Mesh	54	
24261	4508.071784	5b:98:37:35:59:65	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
25393	4810.064219	7b:18:f7:35:59:1d	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
25423	4812.505216	3b:18:34:36:58:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	46	
25648	4832.433580	6f:0d:83:7d:10:28	Broadcast	BT Mesh	49	
25797	4849.242354	5b:19:7f:b5:59:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
25860	4860.103327	7b:18:37:35:59:85	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
25909	4888.123186	73:18:27:35:59:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
26061	4909.584811	7b:18:56:b5:5b:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
27300	5175.108909	7b:18:17:05:41:64	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
27447	5195.515077	7f:18:37:35:59:c5	Broadcast	BT Mesh	46	
27930	5249.845923	2e:98:07:05:59:e5	Broadcast	BT Mesh	50	
27959	5252.568422	5b:18:37:35:59:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	41	
28768	5356.703340	7b:19:16:35:59:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
28949	5384.963579	79:18:3f:34:d9:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
29127	5416.753762	7b:18:77:25:5a:25	Broadcast	BT Mesh	40	
31167	5797.233586	7b:18:37:34:59:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
32351	6482.234947	7b:98:17:35:58:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	38	
32828	6681.500045	7b:1c:36:39:59:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	56	
33633	7063.402140	7b:18:7f:15:55:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
33807	7369.145932	7b:19:37:3d:59:45	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
33851	7412.623025	7b:18:37:f5:55:05	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
33854	7421.042417	7b:18:37:35:d9:04	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
33916	7678.175721	67:8f:1f:71:9b:ff	Broadcast	BT Mesh	50	
35130	8696.791045	67:87:17:b1:92:7e	Broadcast	BT Mesh	38	
36032	9723.610752	64:27:df:31:b3:38	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	

18560	77205.438502	52:8c:77:ca:79:d1	Broadcast	BT Mesh	43	
26029	77700.342759	6b:b6:44:7d:5e:f6	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
27103	77795.056748	6a:b6:44:7d:5e:f6	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
27138	77799.410775	6a:b6:c4:7d:5e:f6	Broadcast	BT Mesh	42	
56	3633.040370	Anonymous	ae:8d:df:99:a4:f8	LE LL	54	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
1696	73551.913138	4e:43:b6:19:0e:31	22:f9:09:e4:0f:9c	LE LL	46	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
1845	74818.992378	Anonymous	Broadcast	LE LL	37	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
110	7644.661478	Anonymous	56:bb:b4:55:d6:b6	LE LL	25	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
137	9756.797208	Anonymous	12:d5:61:af:8e:f4	LE LL	36	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
1363	10812.102579	07:c9:b3:45:a0:26	Broadcast	LE LL	45	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
10433	76423.877844	Anonymous	f8:ca:b2:91:2c:ce	LE LL	49	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
12535	76784.972248	8f:6a:78:5e:db:82	0b:83:f5:cd:dd:58	LE LL	33	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
20724	77354.176792	40:a5:8b:e5:6b:86	Broadcast	LE LL	32	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
24501	77595.233191	Anonymous	d3:c9:b0:a8:98:b6	LE LL	45	AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
24082	77566.227307	SamsungE_9b:14:8d	SamsungE_31:df:08	LE LL	53	AUX_CONNECT_REQ
37	2204.590729	32:f8:9d:3a:79:a0	b1:ab:e8:29:91:bd	LE LL	50	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
38	2297.353324	83:63:47:31:4a:6f	eb:34:68:f1:01:c6	LE LL	32	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
46	3150.335181	bf:64:9f:23:02:d4	1b:d2:d6:85:4e:bb	LE LL	53	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
65	4693.766390	63:98:7d:51:5d:84	17:be:b8:11:e3:62	LE LL	35	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
70	5224.232228	bb:9e:c0:3f:cf:b7	22:7c:bb:1d:c6:76	LE LL	43	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
75	5482.152165	97:f1:62:3d:3e:2b	4e:f2:8b:62:39:2f	LE LL	40	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
125	8919.895270	79:4b:3c:28:59:37	90:4a:68:2a:01:e4	LE LL	52	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
1531	71911.775613	58:47:cc:be:98:6a	0e:16:ae:1c:f3:d6	LE LL	38	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
1843	74809.429831	df:8f:ac:dc:4e:d7	f0:1a:c0:69:c8:70	LE LL	60	AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]

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4/3/2: Packets corresponding to BTLE AUX_SCAN messages

50	3412.517750	8c:78:99:09:e8:77	77:53:dd:9e:28:b4	LE LL	33 AUX_SCAN_REQ
113	7977.762969	6e:cb:c1:c3:cc:c6	c5:07:f2:82:4d:67	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
120	8539.343299	6e:cb:c1:c3:cc:c6	c5:07:f2:82:4d:67	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
152	10480.214139	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
199	10498.061199	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
206	10499.997550	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
214	10503.820931	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
233	10509.618182	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
244	10512.088668	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
246	10512.919916	39:14:69:77:a3:66	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
281	10523.650119	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
295	10528.322365	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
312	10535.176507	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
324	10539.011483	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
366	10549.631356	31:72:71:73:86:0d	22:22:1f:b0:64:3b	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
400	10557.729081	07:30:d2:82:4f:71	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
431	10566.568882	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
470	10576.299509	22:22:1f:b0:40:2b	3f:c7:14:c0:e1:7a	LE LL	38 AUX_SCAN_REQ
543	10598.868374	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
546	10599.417412	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
572	10606.560043	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
576	10607.380753	39:ba:05:8b:39:a9	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
599	10612.606970	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
614	10615.929050	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
625	10618.117552	2a:85:f0:ac:fa:ca	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
652	10625.287095	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
682	10634.640040	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
706	10640.694802	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
714	10642.615268	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
744	10650.363266	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
752	10652.843787	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
777	10659.269239	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
810	10669.971937	06:79:b1:ef:5f:62	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
838	10677.150524	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
841	10677.834623	42:22:1f:b0:64:3b	cc:07:11:22:01:02	LE LL	46 AUX_SCAN_REQ
853	10680.428943	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
889	10690.629287	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
948	10709.909550	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
981	10718.806804	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
991	10720.728517	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1031	10732.843196	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1048	10737.512873	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1079	10744.372425	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1102	10750.134793	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1135	10759.479398	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1169	10768.829247	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1209	10778.173045	78:72:86:87:43:39	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1216	10779.555746	1b:90:fc:44:0e:f1	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1228	10781.489464	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1268	10791.650203	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1301	10798.785359	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1319	10802.633898	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1335	10805.095718	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1351	10808.944769	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1360	10810.871872	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1378	10814.723734	61:20:c7:ac:82:a3	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	LE LL	31 AUX_SCAN_REQ
1459	71538.374324	82:78:15:5f:aa:a0	07:e6:87:1e:9c:f6	LE LL	35 AUX_SCAN_REQ

Study made possible thanks to the financial support of the LNPLV (infovaccin.fr), EFVV (efvv.eu) and many anonymous donors. 11/30/2021



```
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol Length Info
     50 3412.517750    8c:78:99:09:e8:77     77:53:dd:9e:28:b4     LE LL          33 AUX_SCAN_REQ

Frame 50: 33 bytes on wire (264 bits), 33 bytes captured (264 bits) on interface ubertooth-0, id 0
  Interface id: 0 (ubertooth-0)
     Interface name: ubertooth-0
     Interface description: Kismet datasource ubertooth-0 (ubertooth-0 - ubertooth-0:type=ubertooth)
  Encapsulation type: Bluetooth Low Energy Link Layer RF (161)
  Arrival Time: Nov  6, 2021 16:02:29.048614000 CET
  [Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds]
  Epoch Time: 1636210949.048614000 seconds
  [Time delta from previous captured frame: 17.181077000 seconds]
  [Time delta from previous displayed frame: 17.181077000 seconds]
  [Time since reference or first frame: 3412.517750000 seconds]
  Frame Number: 50
  Frame Length: 33 bytes (264 bits)
  Capture Length: 33 bytes (264 bits)
  [Frame is marked: False]
  [Frame is ignored: False]
  [Protocols in frame: bluetooth:btle_rf:btle]
Bluetooth
  [Source: 8c:78:99:09:e8:77 (8c:78:99:09:e8:77)]
  [Destination: 77:53:dd:9e:28:b4 (77:53:dd:9e:28:b4)]
Bluetooth Low Energy RF Info
  RF Channel: 37, 2476 MHz, Data channel 35
  Signal dBm: -99
  Unused signed byte: 0
  Access Address Offenses: 0
  Unused word: 0x8e89bed6
  Flags: 0x0023
     .... .... .... ...1 = Dewhitened: True
     .... .... .... ..1. = Signal Power Valid: True
     .... .... .... .0.. = Noise Power Valid: False
     .... .... .... 0... = Decrypted: False
     .... .... ...0 .... = Reference Access Address Valid: False
     .... .... ..1. .... = Access Address Offenses Valid: True
     .... .... .0.. .... = Channel Aliased: False
     .... ..00 0... .... = PDU Type: Advertising or Data (Unspecified Direction) (0)
     .... .0.. .... .... = CRC Checked: False
     .... 0... .... .... = CRC Valid: False
     ...0 .... .... .... = MIC Checked: False
     ..0. .... .... .... = MIC Valid: False
     00.. .... .... .... = PHY: LE 1M (0)
Bluetooth Low Energy Link Layer
  Access Address: 0x8e89bed6
  Packet Header: 0x0ee3 (PDU Type: AUX_SCAN_REQ, TxAdd: Random, RxAdd: Random)
     .... 0011 = PDU Type: 0x3 AUX_SCAN_REQ
     ...0 .... = Reserved: 0
     ..1. .... = Reserved: 1
     .1.. .... = Tx Address: Random
     1... .... = Rx Address: Random
     Length: 14
  Scanning Address: 8c:78:99:09:e8:77 (8c:78:99:09:e8:77)
  Advertising Address: 77:53:dd:9e:28:b4 (77:53:dd:9e:28:b4)
  CRC: 0xe6efaa
    [Expert Info (Warning/Checksum): Incorrect CRC]
       [Incorrect CRC]
       [Severity level: Warning]

0000  25 9d 00 00 d6 be 89 8e  23 00 d6 be 89 8e e3 0e   %······ #·····
0010  77 e8 09 99 78 8c b4 28  9e dd 53 77 67 f7 55 47   w···x··( ··Swg·UG
0020  53                                                S
```


Study made possible thanks to the financial support of the LNPLV (infovaccin.fr), EFVV (efvv.eu) and many anonymous donors.

4/3/2: Packets corresponding to AUX_CONNECT messages

2352	1763.558555	71:ea:66:14:e0:20	64:0b:23:02:01:02	LE LL	54 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
4294	2492.944386	74:bf:67:2d:cf:24	4d:e6:b0:37:cf:44	LE LL	55 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
5397	2735.659536	4d:c9:4c:ed:8b:65	9a:55:58:f5:4b:f3	LE LL	57 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
7120	2958.139705	7e:b1:a8:d3:d2:e7	61:91:86:1e:e1:03	LE LL	58 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
28944	5384.105866	69:cf:45:c9:13:8b	06:8e:b0:31:55:26	LE LL	53 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
31768	6069.496377	62:64:df:5c:89:c6	0f:b9:ba:d5:26:07	LE LL	57 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
32201	6357.786142	af:cf:a3:cf:df:af	fe:73:3b:1a:55:76	LE LL	55 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
32845	6691.589539	b1:db:51:4d:58:f4	60:87:33:29:51:02	LE LL	54 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
32945	6734.820836	4e:f4:5a:72:92:d2	8e:8a:57:41:05:90	LE LL	57 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
37833	10571.702736	1a:9e:16:c7:0b:0e	4b:3c:9b:1b:03:02	LE LL	56 AUX_CONNECT_REQ

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2352	1763.558555	71:ea:66:14:e0:20	64:0b:23:02:01:02	LE LL	54	AUX_CONNECT_REQ

```
Frame 2352: 54 bytes on wire (432 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface ubertooth-0, id 0
  Interface id: 0 (ubertooth-0)
     Interface name: ubertooth-0
     Interface description: Kismet datasource ubertooth-0 (ubertooth-0 - ubertooth-0:type=ubertooth)
  Encapsulation type: Bluetooth Low Energy Link Layer RF (161)
  Arrival Time: Oct 17, 2021 10:46:50.897024000 CEST
  [Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds]
  Epoch Time: 1634460410.897024000 seconds
  [Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.215241000 seconds]
  [Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.215241000 seconds]
  [Time since reference or first frame: 1763.558555000 seconds]
  Frame Number: 2352
  Frame Length: 54 bytes (432 bits)
  Capture Length: 54 bytes (432 bits)
  [Frame is marked: False]
  [Frame is ignored: False]
  [Protocols in frame: bluetooth:btle_rf:btle:btcommon]
Bluetooth
  [Source: 71:ea:66:14:e0:20 (71:ea:66:14:e0:20)]
  [Destination: 64:0b:23:02:01:02 (64:0b:23:02:01:02)]
Bluetooth Low Energy RF Info
  RF Channel: 37, 2476 MHz, Data channel 35
  Signal dBm: -89
  Unused signed byte: 0
  Access Address Offenses: 0
  Unused word: 0x8e89bed6
  Flags: 0x0023
     .... .... .... ...1 = Dewhitened: True
     .... .... .... ..1. = Signal Power Valid: True
     .... .... .... .0.. = Noise Power Valid: False
     .... .... .... 0... = Decrypted: False
     .... .... ...0 .... = Reference Access Address Valid: False
     .... .... ..1. .... = Access Address Offenses Valid: True
     .... .... .0.. .... = Channel Aliased: False
     .... ..00 0... .... = PDU Type: Advertising or Data (Unspecified Direction) (0)
     .... .0.. .... .... = CRC Checked: False
     .... 0... .... .... = CRC Valid: False
     ...0 .... .... .... = MIC Checked: False
     ..0. .... .... .... = MIC Valid: False
     00.. .... .... .... = PHY: LE 1M (0)
Bluetooth Low Energy Link Layer
  Access Address: 0x8e89bed6
  Packet Header: 0x2345 (PDU Type: AUX_CONNECT_REQ, TxAdd: Random, RxAdd: Public)
     .... 0101 = PDU Type: 0x5 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
     ...0 .... = Reserved: 0
     ..0. .... = Reserved: 0
     .1.. .... = Tx Address: Random
     0... .... = Rx Address: Public
     Length: 35
  Initiator Address: 71:ea:66:14:e0:20 (71:ea:66:14:e0:20)
  Advertising Address: 64:0b:23:02:01:02 (64:0b:23:02:01:02)
  Link Layer Data
     Access Address: 0xec9615fd
```


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

Study made possible thanks to the financial support of the LNPLV (infovaccin.fr), EFVV (efvv.eu) and many anonymous donors.



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```
▾ Bluetooth Low Energy Link Layer
    Access Address: 0x8e89bed6
  ▾ Packet Header: 0x2205 (PDU Type: AUX_CONNECT_REQ, TxAdd: Public, RxAdd: Public)
        .... 0101 = PDU Type: 0x5 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
        ...0 .... = Reserved: 0
        ..0. .... = Reserved: 0
        .0.. .... = Tx Address: Public
        0... .... = Rx Address: Public
        Length: 34
    Initiator Address: SamsungE_9b:14:8d (24:fc:e5:9b:14:8d)
    Advertising Address: SamsungE_31:df:08 (b8:bc:5b:31:df:08)
  ▾ Link Layer Data
        Access Address: 0x489905d6
        CRC Init: 0x4f604b
        Window Size: 5 (6,25 msec)
        Window Offset: 5 (6,25 msec)
        Interval: 6 (7,5 msec)
        Latency: 170
        Timeout: 500 (5000 msec)
      ▸ Channel Map: ffffffff1f
```

```
0000  25 a9 00 00 d6 be 89 8e  23 00 d6 be 89 8e 05 22   %·······  #·····"
0010  8d 14 9b e5 fc 24 08 df  31 5b bc b8 d6 05 99 48   ·····$·· 1[·····H
0020  4b 60 4f 05 05 00 06 00  aa 00 f4 01 ff ff ff ff   K`O····· ········
0030  1f 30 df 39 c2                                    ·0·9·
```

4/3/2: Packets corresponding to unknown messages (or not interpretable as such by the Wire Shark software)

```
11871 76712.777979   57:88:2e:e1:b0:1d   09:01:00:06:ff:0e   LE LL      56 AUX_SCAN_REQ[Malformed Packet]
23514 77544.167918   4c:da:66:eb:5b:9f   58:11:01:3d:17:f3   LE LL      28 AUX_SCAN_REQ[Malformed Packet]
27534 77830.555531   22:02:1f:b0:64:3a   98:0f:15:02:01:42   LE LL      45 AUX_SCAN_REQ[Malformed Packet]
 1508 71863.662070   5a:2f:be:42:d5:9f   Broadcast           BT Mesh PB-…  43 Provisioning Bearer Control[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
27680 77842.705337   3d:1d:df:46:0d:16   Broadcast           BT Mesh PB-…  48 Provisioning Bearer Control[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
28718 77896.179350   66:22:1f:b0:60:3b   Broadcast           BT Mesh PB-…  46 Transaction Continuation[Malformed Packet]
   18 1762.539511    45:05:d9:82:5b:a7   Broadcast           LE LL      52 Unknown
   20 1762.585510    c5:07:f2:82:4d:67   Broadcast           LE LL      52 Unknown
```

```
18560 77205.438502   52:8c:77:ca:79:d1   Broadcast           BT Mesh    43
26029 77700.342759   6b:b6:44:7d:5e:f6   Broadcast           BT Mesh    42
27103 77795.056748   6a:b6:44:7d:5e:f6   Broadcast           BT Mesh    42
27138 77799.410775   6a:b6:c4:7d:5e:f6   Broadcast           BT Mesh    42
   56 3633.040370    Anonymous           ae:8d:df:99:a4:f8   LE LL      54 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
 1696 73551.913138   4e:43:b6:19:0e:31   22:f9:09:e4:0f:9c   LE LL      46 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
 1845 74818.992378   Anonymous           Broadcast           LE LL      37 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
  110 7644.661478    Anonymous           56:bb:b4:55:d6:b6   LE LL      25 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
  137 9756.797208    Anonymous           12:d5:61:af:8e:f4   LE LL      36 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
 1363 10812.102579   07:c9:b3:45:a0:26   Broadcast           LE LL      45 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
10433 76423.877844   Anonymous           f8:ca:b2:91:2c:ce   LE LL      49 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
12535 76784.972248   8f:6a:78:5e:db:82   0b:83:f5:cd:dd:58   LE LL      33 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
20724 77354.176792   40:a5:8b:e5:6b:86   Broadcast           LE LL      32 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
24501 77595.233191   Anonymous           d3:c9:b0:a8:98:b6   LE LL      45 AUX_COMMON[Malformed Packet]
24082 77566.227307   SamsungE_9b:14:8d   SamsungE_31:df:08   LE LL      53 AUX_CONNECT_REQ
   37 2204.590729    32:f8:9d:3a:79:a0   b1:ab:e8:29:91:bd   LE LL      50 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
   38 2297.353324    83:63:47:31:4a:6f   eb:34:68:f1:01:c6   LE LL      32 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
   46 3150.335181    bf:64:9f:23:02:d4   1b:d2:d6:85:4e:bb   LE LL      53 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
   65 4693.766390    63:98:7d:51:5d:84   17:be:b8:11:e3:62   LE LL      35 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
   70 5224.232228    bb:9e:c0:3f:cf:b7   22:7c:bb:1d:c6:76   LE LL      43 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
   75 5482.152165    97:f1:62:3d:3e:2b   4e:f2:8b:62:39:2f   LE LL      40 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
  125 8919.895270    79:4b:3c:28:59:37   90:4a:68:2a:01:e4   LE LL      52 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
 1531 71911.775613   58:47:cc:be:98:6a   0e:16:ae:1c:f3:d6   LE LL      38 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
 1843 74809.429831   df:8f:ac:dc:4e:d7   f0:1a:c0:69:c8:70   LE LL      60 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
```

```
17177 77130.972195   b5:db:d7:de:42:aa   0b:c4:56:af:cf:7a   LE LL      54 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
22398 77469.256938   8d:09:59:38:ae:5e   70:0c:17:b5:b2:4b   LE LL      55 AUX_CONNECT_REQ[Malformed Packet]
   41 2829.881733    92:64:1f:2c:1c:a3   Broadcast           LE LL      48 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
  642 10622.724388   Anonymous           d1:74:57:58:98:25   LE LL      44 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
 1456 71443.253806   Anonymous           Broadcast           LE LL      43 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
17178 77131.164184   81:82:38:62:17:b4   Broadcast           LE LL      46 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
17931 77172.541502   d5:f5:50:d9:dc:e5   Broadcast           LE LL      49 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
26013 77698.980571   Anonymous           BeijingB_b0:c4:e4   LE LL      42 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
26023 77700.073365   Anonymous           e9:42:6a:b6:40:3d   LE LL      41 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
26473 77739.610990   Anonymous           09:0d:78:ae:c6:7d   LE LL      37 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet: length of contained item exceeds length of containing item]
    9 421.440920     Anonymous           Broadcast           LE LL      30 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet]
   10 747.384849     0e:01:c8:1a:76:ec   Broadcast           LE LL      40 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet]
   57 3765.709238    Anonymous           f4:71:49:68:eb:03   LE LL      25 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet]
   63 4658.945088    6d:7d:ef:3c:64:fb   Broadcast           LE LL      54 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet]
   94 5740.959393    Anonymous           36:cd:10:dc:e0:d1   LE LL      48 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet]
  118 8374.569051    Anonymous           Broadcast           LE LL      30 AUX_CONNECT_RSP[Malformed Packet]
```


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29790	77931.071351	MS-NLB-PhysServer-32_0…	Broadcast	LE LL	46 Unknown[Malformed Packet]
29854	77932.096104	22:20:5f:b0:64:3b	Broadcast	LE LL	46 Unknown[Malformed Packet]
29887	77932.591668	35:8c:77:ca:79:d1	Broadcast	LE LL	43 Unknown[Malformed Packet]
29908	77933.121222	2a:22:1f:70:64:3b	Broadcast	LE LL	46 Unknown[Malformed Packet]
29932	77933.686559	d0:89:05:5c:59:75	Broadcast	LE LL	60 Unknown[Malformed Packet]
911	10699.467115	56:c0:23:54:e6:e7	Broadcast	BT Mesh	43 [Malformed Packet]
1462	71630.384194	4c:64:fd:da:fc:5f	Broadcast	BT Mesh	43 [Malformed Packet]
1473	71702.347915	4c:64:fd:da:fc:5f	Broadcast	BT Mesh	43 [Malformed Packet]
1479	71705.650330	4c:64:bd:da:fc:5f	Broadcast	BT Mesh	43 [Malformed Packet]
1499	71858.409012	4a:3f:be:42:55:9b	Broadcast	BT Mesh	43 [Malformed Packet]

5 / Conclusions and perspectives

In view of these results, we can confirm that a significant percentage of people injected and, to a lesser extent, people not injected but tested by PCR tests emit alphanumeric signals over the frequency range corresponding to that of Bluetooth use.

This percentage will have to be specified by future studies in order to highlight the potential impact of the following factors:

- Brand of the injected product
- Candidate profile:o
  - Number of injection (s)
  - o received Date of last injection

Many frames appear in connection with these signals which are uninterpretable in the current state of things by the Wire Shark software.

One of the common characteristics of these frames is the low dBm level.

Among the probable explanations for the incomplete or even uninterpretable nature of these frames of the hypotheses should be explored:

- Different modulation from that usually used for conventional BTLE protocols
- A problem of insufficient energy to activate an action trigger

- A series of actions scheduled on channel hops (inside the Bluetooth frequency range and / or outside it).

There is a very clear prominence of signals emitted in an ambient environment compared to signals emitted in an environment without electromagnetic activity.

Additional tests should therefore confirm this trend and identify the triggering factors of the signals to specify their nature and especially the functionality (s).

These alphanumeric signals are not constant over time and their appearance is brief.

It is possible that a scheduled scheduling (fixed or random, depending on triggers such as social interactions) underlies these appearances.

Many other experiments will undoubtedly be necessary to acquire enough data to identify redundancies, cycles, patterns ...

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